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Abstract
Using the model based on Inderst and Irmen (2005), we analyze retail industries with
competition in business hours and prices and examine the desirable degree of business hours
regulation for policy makers who have objectives to enhance the welfare. We find that the
strict regulation of business hours, which business hours are regulated in all regions, enhances
the welfare only when the transportation cost parameter is relatively large. This implies
that, contrary to some previous studies, the deregulation is not always welfare enhancing.
Although some countries have regulated business hours only in some regions, such partial
regulation might worsen the welfare because a retail store located at deregulated regions
charges a higher price.
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1 Introduction
Recently, different countries have different degrees of business hours regulation in retail sector.
Countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Korea maintain substantial restric-
tions on business hours in all regions of the country. On the other hand, France and Germany
regulate business hours in some regions of the country. For example, France implements Interna-
tional Tourist Zones (ZTIs), which ease the restrictions on business hours of retail stores located
at tourist zones including Paris and outside the capital. In Germany, since 2006, business hours
has been allowed some states to be extended past 8 p.m. Japan has completely deregulated busi-
ness hours in all regions of the country since 2000. Different degrees of business hours regulation
may have different effects on price competition among retail stores and consumer welfare. This
raises a question: what’s the desirable degree of business hours regulation for policy makers?
To address this issue, this paper examines the desirable regulatory policy in terms of the
welfare. We set up an extended version of the standard Hotelling (1929) model with the two
dimensional time-location space. Consumers have preferences over the location of retailers and
over shopping time. Even if no retailer opens at their preferred shopping time, they cannot either
advance or postpone their shopping time because time-constrained consumers suffer an infinite
disutility of adjusting their shopping times.1 There are two retailers. Each retailer locates in a
different region and competes in business hours and prices. The game runs as follows. First, a
policy maker decides how and to what extent to regulate business hours. Given the extent of
business hours regulation, retailers simultaneously determine their closing times. Finally, after
having observed the time decision, they compete in price.
Within the above framework of the model, we investigate how policy makers should design
regulatory policy in retail sector. This paper considers three regulation levels. One is the case
of complete liberalization, where retailers in all regions can decide their closing times with no
restrictions on business hours. Another is the case of partial regulation, where a policy maker
sets an upper limit of business hours only in one region. In this case, retailers in regulated and
deregulated regions compete in business hours. The other is the case of complete regulation,
where restrictions on business hours are imposed on retailers in all regions. Comparing these
cases, we discuss the welfare implications of regulatory policy.
We find that the equilibrium business hours depends on the regulation level. With both
complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours, one retailer is open full-time
whereas another retailer operates part-time. With complete regulation of business hours, one
retailer is open to full-time up to the upper limit of business hours whereas another retailer
operates part-time. In any regulation levels, the store with longer business hours charges a
higher price and serves more customers, and thereby, it earns a higher profit. We also find
1Some theoretical papers assume that consumers are flexible about adjusting (postponing or advancing) their
shopping times if retailers are closed at their preferred times although consumers suffer a disutility of adjusting
their shopping times (e.g., Inderst and Irmen (2005), Shy and Stenbacka (2006, 2008), Wenzel (2011), and Flores
and Wenzel (2016)).
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that charged prices, demand, and profits with complete liberalization and partial regulation of
business hours are higher than those with complete regulation. Only when the transportation
cost parameter is relatively large, complete regulation enhances welfare. This implies that,
contrary to some previous studies, the deregulation is not always welfare enhancing. Although,
in reality, France and Germany have eased restrictions on business hours only for retailers located
in some regions of the country, such partial regulation of business hours would worsen welfare.
Therefore, policy makers might be better to set an upper limit of business hours for all retailers
in all regions. The optimal upper limit of business hours with complete regulation depends
on the gross surplus derived from the consumption of the retail product, the mass of day-time
shoppers, and the transportation cost parameter. The larger the gross surplus (the mass of
day-time shoppers), the longer the optimal upper limit of business hours. On the other hand,
the larger the transportation cost parameter, the shorter the optimal upper limit of business
hours.
Extending the basic model, we consider a situation in which consumers can advance their
shopping if a retailer is closed at their preferred shopping time. Our findings are as follows.
With complete liberalization of business hours, both retailers operate full-time. With partial
regulation of business hours, one retailer is open full-time whereas another retailer operates
part-time. With complete regulation of business hours, both retailers are open to full-time up to
the upper limit of business hours. The price of a retailer which opens for longer is highest when
business hours are partially regulated. Thus, the welfare with partial regulation of business hours
is lower than that with complete liberalization and regulation of business hours. This implies
that policy makers might be better to set an upper limit of business hours for all retailers in all
regions if she/he consider the regulatory restrictions on the retail industry.
The existing literature on business hours has largely focused on how the deregulation of
business hours affects the structure and competitiveness of the retail industry. Some empirical
studies show that deregulation leads to higher prices in large retail stores, and redistribution of
industry profitability from small to large retail stores (Morrison and Newman 1983; Tanguay et
al. 1995).2 Theoretically, Clemenz (1990) shows that deregulation lead to lower prices as longer
business hours facilitate the comparison of prices. Recent theoretical studies find that retail
prices increase when a retail store opens for longer than its competitors under deregulation
(Inderst and Irmen 2005; Shy and Stenbacka 2008; Wenzel 2011; Flores and Wenzel 2016;
Yamada 2019). Shy and Stenbacka (2008) and Yamada (2019) examine the effect of business
hours deregulation on social welfare. They denote there is no justification for regulation of
business hours. Similarly, Wenzel (2011) shows that business hours deregulation increases social
welfare and consumer welfare. Contrary to these studies, Flores (2015) theoretically finds that
2de Haas et al. (2020) examine empirically the drivers of the decision on whether retail stores extend their
business hours by using data on the business hours of all German retail grocery stores and the distance between
them. They finds that the probability that a retail store expands business hours increases if nearby competitors
already are open for a long time.
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business hours deregulation is not always welfare enhancing.3 The main purpose of our study
is to show the optimal degree of business hours regulation in retail industry, and thereby the
justification for restrictions on business hours. For this purpose, unlike these literatures, we
introduce policy makers’ decision on the level of business hours restriction.4
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Section
3 describes the equilibrium in three cases: case (a) complete liberalization of business hours;
case (b) partial regulation of business hours; case (c) complete regulation of business hours.
Section 4 considers welfare implications of business hours regulation. In this section, we derive
our main result concerning the desirable business hours regulation for policy makers. Section 5
discusses an extension of the model, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this paper, we set up the model based on Inderst and Irmen (2005) with product differentiation
in two dimensions: space and time.5 To represent the first dimension, we consider that consumers
are uniformly distributed on a line segment [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we normalize total
population to 1. The location of a consumer, denoted by x ∈ [0, 1], is associated with her/his
shopping-location preference. The location of retailers, store 1 and 2, is exogenous. Store 1
locates at 0 and store 2 does at 1. Let xi be the location of store i (i = 1, 2). If there is no
retail store at their preferred location, the consumers incur transport cost t|x− xi| to travel to
a store, where t > 0 is the transportation cost parameter.
To present the second dimension, we consider a time line segment [0, 1] with piecewise uni-
formly distributed consumers. The location of a consumer on the time line is denoted by y
which represents her/his preferred shopping time. A consumer is characterized by her/his ad-
dress (x, y). Addresses are independently distributed over [0, 1]× [0, 1]. The mass of consumers
located at y = 0 is K ∈ (1/2, 1) and that of consumers located at y ∈ (0, 1] is 1 − K. Note
that the number of day-time shoppers is greater than that of night-time shoppers. Consumers
located at y = 0 prefer to go shopping during the day, and consumers located at y ∈ (0, 1] prefer
to go shopping during the night because of working hours during the day. The location of store
i (i = 1, 2) on the time line is denoted by yi which represents the closing time of store i. The
night-time shoppers can buy a product only if a store locates at their preferred shopping time
(yi < y).
6 This implies that extended business hours have a market expansion effect.
Each consumer buys a product from a store that maximizes her/his indirect utility. The
3Flores (2015) examines whether extending business hours are effective to deter entry of potential competitors
and discusses the welfare implications of such an entry deterrence behavior.
4Also, we introduce a market expansion effect due to extended business hours such as Flores and Wenzel (2016)
and Yamada (2019).
5Yamada (2019) also uses an extended version of Inderst and Irmen (2005) and examines the relationship
between store quality and business hours.
6Section 5 considers the effects of consumers’ shopping time flexibility on equilibrium business hours, prices,
and the welfare.
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indirect utility is given by
U =


S − pi − t|x− xi| open at preferred time,
0 otherwise.
S denotes the gross surplus derived from the consumption of the retail product. We assume
S ≥ 4t to ensure that a store who opens longer sells to both day-time and night-time shoppers.
pi is the price charged by store i. Stores are constrained to charge a single price, regardless of
their business hours.
Stores have constant marginal costs of serving consumers and marginal operating costs which
increase with the time already open. For simplify, normalize both the marginal costs to zero.
The profit of store i is denoted by pii = piDi, where Di is the respective store’s demand.
The game runs as follows. First, a policy maker, who has objective to enhance consumer
welfare, decides how and to what extent to regulate business hours. Here, we consider three
cases of regulation level of business hours: case (a) complete liberalization of business hours;
case (b) partial regulation of business hours; case (c) complete regulation of business hours. In
the case of complete liberalization, a policy maker does not set an upper limit of business hours.
In the case of partial regulation, she/he sets an upper limit of business hours, y¯ ∈ (0, 1), only for
store 2 located at 1 in geographical line. In the case of complete regulation, she/he sets y¯ in all
stores. Second, given the extent of business hours regulation, stores simultaneously determine
their closing times, yi. Finally, after having observed the time decision, stores compete in prices.
3 Equilibrium
Here, we derive the equilibrium in three cases of regulation level of business hours. Without loss
of generality, suppose as follows: in case (a), 0 ≤ y2 ≤ y1 ≤ 1; in case (b), 0 ≤ y2 ≤ y¯ ≤ y1 ≤ 1;
in case (c), 0 ≤ y2 ≤ y1 ≤ y¯ ≤ 1. In each case, there exist three categories of consumers. First,
consumer y ∈ [0, y2] can buy from either store. Second, consumer y ∈ (y2, y1] can buy only
from store 1. Second, consumer y ∈ (y1, 1] cannot buy from any store. Consumer y ∈ [0, y2] is
indifferent between store 1 and 2 if
S − p1 − tx = S − p2 − t(1− x).
or explicitly by
x¯ =
p2 − p1 + t
2t
.
Stores’ demand functions are
D1 = (K + (1−K)y2)x¯+ (1−K)(y1 − y2),
D2 = (K + (1−K)y2)(1− x¯),
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where (K + (1 − K)y2) and (1 − K)(y1 − y2) represent the mass of consumer y ∈ [0, y2] and
y ∈ (y2, y1], respectively.
Given stores’ business hours decisions in each case, prices are given by
p1 =
t(3K + (1−K)(4y1 − y2))
3(K + (1−K)y2)
, p2 =
t(3K + (1−K)(2y1 + y2))
3(K + (1−K)y2)
.
Store i chooses yi to maximize pii in anticipation of p1 and p2. Solving the problem, we derive
the equilibrium business hours y∗i and obtain the following result:
Result 1 (i) With both complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours, y∗1 = 1
and y∗2 = 0; (ii) with complete regulation of business hours, y
∗
1 = y¯ and y
∗
2 = 0.
The second-order conditions are given by
∂2pi1
∂y21
=
16(1−K)2t
9(K + (1−K)y2)
,
∂2pi2
∂y22
=
4(1−K)2t(K + (1−K)y1)
2
9(K + (1−K)y2)3
.
These imply that there exist possible corner solutions. With complete liberalization of business
hours, we obtain three possible corner solutions: (i) y1 = 1 and y2 = 0; (ii) y1 = 1 and y2 = 1;
(iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0. With partial regulation of business hours, we obtain three possible
corner solutions: (i) y1 = 1 and y2 = 0; (ii) y1 = 1 and y2 = y¯; (iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0. In these
cases, only the pair of y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 appears in equilibrium. With complete regulation of
business hours, we obtain three possible corner solutions: (i) y1 = y¯ and y2 = 0; (ii) y1 = y¯ and
y2 = y¯; (iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0. Only the pair of y1 = y¯ and y2 = 0 appears in equilibrium
(the proof is in the appendix). Note that the equilibrium business hours in case (c) implies that
under complete regulation, stores choose an asymmetric configuration of location in time. That
is, in any cases, business hours are effective as an instrument to achieve differentiation.7
The resulting equilibrium prices and profits are shown in Table 1. Here, we obtain the
following result:
Result 2 With complete regulation of business hours, equilibrium prices and demand increases
as the upper limit of business hours, y¯, increases.
We find that ∂p∗ir/∂y¯ > 0 and ∂D
∗
ir/∂y¯ > 0 (i ∈ 1, 2, i ̸= j), where r denotes complete regulation
of business hours. This implies that business hours deregulation leads to increased prices and
demand. That is, extended business hours relax price competition and increase consumers who
can shop at their preferred time. The increased prices have a negative impact on consumer
surplus whereas the increased demand has a positive impact.
7Considering consumers’ shopping time flexibility, we find that stores choose a symmetric configuration of
business hours. See Section 5.
6
Comparing the equilibria of complete liberalization, partial regulation, and complete regula-
tion of business hours, we obtain the following result:
Result 3 (i) In each case, store 1 with longer business hours charges a higher price and serves
more customers, and thereby, it earns a higher profit. (ii) Charged prices, demand, and profits
with complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours are higher than those with
complete regulation. (iii) The difference in price between deregulation (complete liberalization
or partial regulation) of business hours or complete regulation of business hours increases in the
transportation cost parameter.
The intuition of Result 3 (i) is simple. In each case, store 1 that opens longer can monopolize
night-time shoppers due to market expansion effect, leading to a higher price and demand.
Whereas store 2 that operates part-time charges a lower price in order to attract day-time
shoppers. Result 3 (ii) can be confirmed by the fact that dp∗ir/dy¯ > 0 and dD
∗
ir/dy¯ > 0. Result
3 (iii) can be confirmed by the fact that d(p∗id − p
∗
ir)/dt > 0, where d denotes the deregulation
(complete liberalization and partial regulation) of business hours.
Table 1: Equilibrium prices, profits, and price for linear demand.
Complete liberalization & Partial regulation case Complete regulation case
Price p
∗
1d =
(4−K)t
3K , p
∗
2d =
(2+K)t
3K p
∗
1r =
t(3K+4(1−K)y¯)
3K , p
∗
2r =
t(3K+2(1−K)y¯)
3K
Profit pi
∗
1d =
(4−K)2t
18K , pi
∗
2d =
(2+K)2t
18K pi
∗
1r =
t(3K+4(1−K)y¯)2
18K , pi
∗
2r =
t(3K+2(1−K)y¯)2
18K
Demand D
∗
1d =
4−K
6 , D
∗
2d =
2+K
6 D
∗
1r =
3K+4(1−K)y¯
6 , D
∗
2r =
3K+2(1−K)y¯
6
4 Welfare Implications
This section discusses the desirable regulatory policy in terms of consumer welfare.8 With
complete regulation of business hours (case (c)), consumer welfare is defined by
CW = (K + (1−K)y¯)
∫ x¯
0
(S − p1 − tm)dm+K
∫ 1
x¯
(S − p2 − t(1−m))dm.
With complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours (case (a) and (b)), con-
sumer welfare is defined by
CW =
∫ x¯
0
(S − p1 − tm)dm+K
∫ 1
x¯
(S − p2 − t(1−m))dm.
8Although we abstain from discussing total welfare, we find that complete regulation of business hours enhances
total welfare when the transportation cost parameter t is relatively large. This is similar to the condition which
complete regulation enhances consumer welfare.
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Note that consumer welfare in case (a) is equal to that in case (b) because the equilibrium value
is equal in both cases.
Comparing consumer welfare in case (c) with consumer welfare in case (a) and (b), we have
the following result:
Result 4 (i) Consumer welfare with complete regulation of business hours is greater than that
with the deregulation (complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours) if
12K(2−5K+2(1−K)y¯)S
28−5K(12+17K)+4(1−K)y¯(7−8K+7(1−K)y¯) < t <
S
4 , (ii) consumer welfare with the deregulation (com-
plete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours) is greater than that with complete
regulation of business hours if t < 12K(2−5K+2(1−K)y¯)S28−5K(12+17K)+4(1−K)y¯(7−8K+7(1−K)y¯) .
This implies that the deregulation is not always welfare enhancing. If the transportation cost
parameter t is relatively large, complete regulation of business hours is welfare enhancing. The
intuition is simple: the larger the transportation cost parameter t, the more consumers suffer
disutility under deregulation (complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours).
In addition, the larger t, the higher the price under deregulation than the price under regulation.
That is, with the deregulation, such negative effects on consumers dominate the positive effect
of increased demand due to extended business hours. Therefore, a policy maker should choose
complete regulation and set an upper limit of business hours in both stores in terms of consumer
welfare when t is relatively large. In reality, some policy makers regulate business hours only
in some regions of the country. For example, France has eased restrictions on business hours
only for retail stores located in tourist areas. However, such partial regulation of business hours
would worsen consumer welfare.
Some previous studies show that business hours deregulation is always welfare enhancing. Shy
and Stenbacka (2008) and Yamada (2019) show that the deregulation increases social welfare.
Wenzel (2011) also shows that the deregulation increases both social welfare and consumer
welfare. In contrast, we show the justification for strict restrictions on business hours, as Flores
(2015) shows. Here, we examine the optimal upper limit of business hours under the complete
regulation when t is relatively large. A policy maker chooses y¯ to maximize consumer welfare
in case (c). Solving the maximization problem, we obtain the following result:
Result 5 (i) With complete regulation of business hours, a policy maker should set the upper
limit of business hours at y¯∗ = K(12S+2t−
√
144S2−708St+2461t2)
42(1−K)t in terms of consumer welfare. (ii)
As the gross surplus S increases, the optimal upper limit for the policy maker y¯∗ is extended.
(iii) As the transportation cost t increases, the optimal upper limit for the policy maker y¯∗ is
shortened. (iv) As the mass of day-time shoppers K increases, the optimal upper limit for the
policy maker y¯∗ is extended.
The intuition of Result 5 (ii) is simple: the extended y¯ relaxes price competition, leading to the
negative effect on consumers. However, the larger S, the more such negative effect are mitigated.
Therefore, a policy maker has incentives to extend y¯ when S is large. The intuition of Result
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5 (ii) is as follows: the extended y¯ increases consumers who can shop. However, the larger t,
the more consumers suffer disutility. Therefore, when t is large, a policy maker has incentives
to shorten y¯ in order to decrease consumers who suffer disutility. The intuition of Result 5
(iv) comes from the fact that, by extending y¯∗, more night-time shoppers can shop at store 1,
yielding the increased consumer welfare.
5 Extension
Extending the basic model, we consider a situation in which consumers can advance their shop-
ping if a store is closed at their preferred shopping time. The indirect utility is given by
U = S − pi − t|x− xi| − τ(y, yi),
where
τ(y, yi) =


τ if yi < y,
0 if y ≤ yi.
Each consumer incurs additional inconvenience costs τ > 0 for shifting (advancing) the shopping
if a store is closed at her/his preferred shopping time. Suppose now S > 2t+ 19τ to ensure that
a store who opens longer sells to both day-time and night-time shoppers.
Consumer y ∈ [0, y2] is indifferent between buying at store 1 and buying at store 2 if S −
p1 − tx = S − p2 − t(1 − x). The location of such indifferent consumers is given by x¯α =
(p2 − p1 + t)/2t. Consumer y ∈ (y2, y1] is indifferent between buying at store 1 and buying at
store 2 if S− p1− tx = S− p2− t(1−x)− τ . The location of such indifferent consumers is given
by x¯β = (p2 − p1 + t+ τ)/2t. Consumer y ∈ (y1, 1] is indifferent between buying at store 1 and
not buying at all if S − p1 − tx− τ = 0. The location of such indifferent consumers is given by
x¯γ = (S − p1 − τ)/t. Stores’ demand functions are given by
D1 = (K + (1−K)y2)x¯α + (1−K)(y1 − y2)x¯β + (1−K)(1− y1)x¯γ ,
D2 = (K + (1−K)y2)(1− x¯α) + (1−K)(y1 − y2)(1− x¯β).
Now we have the following result regarding the equilibrium business hours. The proof is
given in the appendix.
Result 6 (i) With complete liberalization of business hours, y∗∗1 = 1 and y
∗∗
2 = 1; (ii) with
partial regulation of business hours, y∗∗1 = 1 and y
∗∗
2 = 0; (iii) with complete regulation of
business hours, y∗∗1 = y¯ and y
∗∗
2 = y¯.
Note that Result 6 (i) and (iii) imply that stores choose a symmetric configuration of location
in time with complete liberalization and regulation of business hours. The intuition is simple:
shortened business hours would decrease demand as consumers incur additional inconvenience
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costs τ for shifting the shopping. Thus, both stores have incentives to acquire customers due to
extended business hours. The intuition of Result 6 (ii) is as follows: Store 1 extends business
hours in order to attract night-time shoppers distributed on the time line y ∈ (0, 1]. On the
other hand, in anticipation of such store 1’s action, store 2 shortens business hours in order to
target day-time shoppers.
We then obtain the following result:
Result 7 (i) With complete liberalization of business hours, store 1 with longer business hours
charges lower prices and acquires more customers, but earns lower profits; (ii) with partial
regulation of business hours, store 1 with longer business hours charges higher prices and acquires
more customers and profits; (iii) with complete regulation of business hours, the price, demand,
and profit of store 1 are equal to those of store 2; (iv) the price of store 1 is highest when business
hours are partially regulated.
The intuition of Result 7 (i) is simple: with complete liberalization of business hours, store 1
charges lower prices in order to attract consumers y ∈ (y1, 1]. The intuition of Result 7 (ii) and
(iv) is as follows: with partial regulation of business hours, store 1 that opens longer charges
higher prices as it can monopolize night-time shoppers. Therefore, the price of store 1 in the case
of partial regulation of business hours is higher than that of store 1 with other cases (complete
liberalization and regulation of business hours). Result 7 (iii) is the well-known result and can
be confirmed by the fact that the demand of store 1 is equal to that of store 2.
For simplify, assuming K = 2/3, we obtain the following result:
Result 8 Consumer welfare with partial regulation of business hours is lower than that with
complete liberalization and regulation of business hours only if 827τ < t ≤
6
19τ and 2t+
1
9τ < S <
−59 t+ τ .
The intuition can be confirmed by Result 7 (iv). We also find that the highest consumer
welfare is in the case of complete liberalization of business hours, as some previous studies show.
France implements the policy which restricts on business hours of stores located at tourist zones.
However, such partial regulation policy would worsen consumer welfare. This implies that policy
makers might be better to set an upper limit of business hours for retailers in all regions of the
country if she/he has objectives for the regulatory restrictions on the retail industry.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes retail industries with competition in business hours and prices and examines
the effect of regulation of business hours on consumer welfare.
Countries vary in the degree of regulation of business hours. Using an extended version of the
standard Hotelling (1929) model with the two dimensional time-location space, we investigate
how and to what extent policy makers should regulate business hours in terms of consumer
10
welfare. This paper considers three levels of business hours regulation. One is the case of
complete liberalization, where there are no regulations on business hours. Another is the case
of partial regulation, where a policy maker sets an upper limit of business hours only for one
store. The other is the case of complete regulation, where she/he sets an upper limit of business
hours for all stores.
We find that consumer welfare with complete regulation of business hours is greater than that
with complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours only when the transporta-
tion cost parameter is relatively large. This implies that, contrary to some previous studies,
the deregulation (complete liberalization and partial regulation of business hours) is not always
welfare enhancing. Although France and Germany have regulated business hours only in some
regions of the country, such partial regulation might worsen consumer welfare because a retail
store located at deregulated areas charges a higher price.
Appendix
Proof of Result 1
Here, we prove Result 1, which characterizes the business hours equilibrium. First, consider
the complete liberalization of business hours. For the pattern (i) y1 = 1 and y2 = 0, suppose
that store 1 deviates to y1 = 0 from y1 = 1 given y2 = 0. The deviation profit of store 1 is
given by piκ1 = Kt/2. Comparing the profit before deviation pi
∗
1d with pi
κ
1 , pi
∗
1d is greater than pi
κ
1 .
Thus, store 1 has no incentives to deviate to y1 = 0 from y1 = 1. Then, suppose that store 2
deviates to y2 = 1 from y2 = 0 given y1 = 1. The deviation profit of store 2 is given by pi
κ
2 = t/2.
Comparing the profit before deviation pi∗2d with pi
κ
2 , pi
∗
2d is greater than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2 also
has no incentives to deviate to y2 = 1 from y2 = 0. Thus, the pair of y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 appears
in equilibrium. For the pattern (ii) y1 = 1 and y2 = 1, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = 0
from y2 = 1 given y1 = 1. The deviation profit of store 2 is given by pi
κ
2 = (2 + K)
2t/18K.
Comparing the profit before deviation pi∗2d with pi
κ
2 , pi
∗
2d is smaller than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2 has
incentives to deviate to y2 = 0 from y2 = 1. Thus, the pair of y1 = 1 and y2 = 1 does not appear
in equilibrium. For the pattern (iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 1
from y1 = 0 given y2 = 0. The deviation profit of store 1 is given by pi
κ
1 = (4 − K)
2t/18K.
Comparing the profit before deviation pi∗1d with pi
κ
1 , pi
∗
1d is smaller than pi
κ
1 , so that store 1 has
incentives to deviate to y1 = 1 from y1 = 0. Thus, the pair of y1 = 0 and y2 = 0 does not appear
in equilibrium.
Second, consider the partial regulation of business hours. For the pattern (i) y1 = 1 and
y2 = 0, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 0 from y1 = 1 given y2 = 0. The deviation
profit of store 1 is given by piκ1 = Kt/2. Comparing pi
∗
1d with pi
κ
1 , pi
∗
1d is greater than pi
κ
1 .
Thus, store 1 has no incentives to deviate to y1 = 0 from y1 = 1. Then, suppose that store
2 deviates to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0 given y1 = 1. The deviation profit of store 2 is given by
piκ2 = (2 + K + (1 − K)y¯)
2t/18(K + (1 − K)y¯). Comparing pi∗2d with pi
κ
2 , pi
∗
2d is greater than
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piκ2 , so that store 2 also has no incentives to deviate to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0. Thus, the pair of
y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 appears in equilibrium. For the pattern (ii) y1 = 1 and y2 = y¯, suppose that
store 2 deviates to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯ given y1 = 1. The deviation profit of store 2 is given
by piκ2 = (2 + K)
2t/18K. Comparing pi∗2d with pi
κ
2 , pi
∗
2d is smaller than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2 has
incentives to deviate to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯. Thus, the pair of y1 = 1 and y2 = y¯ does not appear
in equilibrium. For the pattern (iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 1
from y1 = 0 given y2 = 0. The deviation profit of store 1 is given by pi
κ
1 = (4 − K)
2t/18K.
Comparing pi∗1d with pi
κ
1 , pi
∗
1d is smaller than pi
κ
1 , so that store 1 has incentives to deviate to
y1 = 1 from y1 = 0. Thus, the pair of y1 = 0 and y2 = 0 does not appear in equilibrium.
Finally, consider the complete regulation of business hours. For the pattern (i) y1 = y¯ and
y2 = 0, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 0 from y1 = y¯ given y2 = 0. The deviation profit of
store 1 is given by piκ1 = Kt/2. Comparing pi
∗
1r with pi
κ
1 , pi
∗
1r is greater than pi
κ
1 . Thus, store 1 has
no incentives to deviate to y1 = 0 from y1 = y¯. Then, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = y¯
from y2 = 0 given y1 = y¯. The deviation profit of store 2 is given by pi
κ
2 = (K + (1 −K)y¯)t/2.
Comparing pi∗2r with pi
κ
2 , pi
∗
2r is greater than pi
κ
2 . Thus, store 2 also has no incentives to deviate
to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0. The pair of y1 = y¯ and y2 = 0 appears in equilibrium. For the pattern
(ii) y1 = y¯ and y2 = y¯, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯ given y1 = y¯. The
deviation profit of store 2 is given by piκ2 = (3K + 2(1−K)y¯)
2t/18K. Comparing pi∗2r with pi
κ
2 ,
pi∗2r is smaller than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2 has incentives to deviate to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯. The pair
of y1 = y¯ and y2 = y¯ does not appear in equilibrium. For the pattern (iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0,
suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = y¯ from y1 = 0 given y2 = 0. The deviation profit of store
1 is given by piκ1 = (3K + 4(1 −K)y¯)
2t/18K. Comparing pi∗1r with pi
κ
1 , pi
∗
1r is smaller than pi
κ
1 ,
so that store 1 has incentives to deviate to y1 = y¯ from y1 = 0. Thus, the pair of y1 = 0 and
y2 = 0 does not appear in equilibrium.
Proof of Result 6
We prove Result 6, which characterizes the business hours equilibrium by extending the basic
model. First, consider the complete liberalization of business hours. For the pattern (i) y1 = 1
and y2 = 0, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = 1 from y2 = 0 given y1 = 1. The deviation
profit of store 2 is given by piκ2 = t/2. Comparing the profit before deviation pi
∗∗
2 = (9t−τ)
2/162t
with piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is smaller than pi
κ
2 . Thus, store 2 has incentives to deviate to y2 = 1 from y2 = 0,
so that the pair of y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 does not appear in equilibrium. For the pattern (ii) y1 = 1
and y2 = 1, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 0 from y1 = 1 given y2 = 1. The deviation
profit of store 1 is given by piκ1 = (4S + 6t − 5τ)
2/294t. Comparing the profit before deviation
pi∗∗1 = t/2 with pi
κ
1 , pi
∗∗
1 is greater than pi
κ
1 . Thus, store 1 has no incentives to deviate to y1 = 0
from y1 = 1. Then, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = 0 from y2 = 1 given y1 = 1. The
deviation profit of store 2 is given by piκ2 = (9t−τ)
2/162t. Comparing the profit before deviation
pi∗∗2 = t/2 with pi
κ
2 , pi
∗∗
2 is greater than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2 has no incentives to deviate to y2 = 0
from y2 = 1. Thus, the pair of y1 = 1 and y2 = 1 appear in equilibrium. For the pattern (iii)
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y1 = 0 and y2 = 0, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 1 from y1 = 0 given y2 = 0. The
deviation profit of store 1 is given by piκ1 = (9t+τ)
2/162t. Comparing the profit before deviation
pi∗∗1 = 2(2S + 3t − 2τ)
2/147t with piκ1 , pi
∗∗
1 is smaller than pi
κ
1 . Thus, store 1 has incentives to
deviate to y1 = 1 from y1 = 0. Then, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = 1 from y2 = 0 given
y1 = 0. The deviation profit of store 2 is given by pi
κ
2 = (2S + 10t + τ)
2/588t. Comparing the
profit before deviation pi∗∗2 = (S + 5t− τ)
2/147t with piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is smaller than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2
also has incentives to deviate to y2 = 1 from y2 = 0. Thus, the pair of y1 = 0 and y2 = 0 does
not appear in equilibrium.
Second, consider the partial regulation of business hours. For the pattern (i) y1 = 1 and
y2 = 0, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 0 from y1 = 1 given y2 = 0. The deviation profit
of store 1 is given by piκ1 = 2(2S + 3t − 2τ)
2/147t. Comparing pi∗∗1 = (9t + τ)
2/162t with piκ1 ,
pi∗∗1 is greater than pi
κ
1 . Thus, store 1 has no incentives to deviate to y1 = 0 from y1 = 1. Then,
suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0 given y1 = 1. The deviation profit of store
2 is given by piκ2 = (S + 5t− τ)
2/147t. Comparing pi∗∗2 = (9t− τ)
2/162t with piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is greater
than piκ2 , so that store 2 also has no incentives to deviate to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0. Thus, the pair
of y1 = 1 and y2 = 0 appears in equilibrium. For the pattern (ii) y1 = 1 and y2 = y¯, suppose
that store 2 deviates to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯ given y1 = 1. The deviation profit of store 2 is
given by piκ2 = (9t + τ)
2/162t. Comparing pi∗∗2 = (9t − τ + τ y¯)
2/162t with piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is smaller
than piκ2 . Thus, store 2 has incentives to deviate to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯. The pair of y1 = 1
and y2 = y¯ does not appear in equilibrium. For the pattern (iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0, suppose
that store 1 deviates to y1 = 1 from y1 = 0 given y2 = 0. The deviation profit of store 1 is
given by piκ1 = (9t + τ)
2/162t. Comparing pi∗∗1 = 2(2S + 3t − 2τ)
2/147t with piκ1 , pi
∗∗
1 is smaller
than piκ1 . Thus, store 1 has incentives to deviate to y1 = 1 from y1 = 0. Then, suppose that
store 2 deviates to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0 given y1 = 0. The deviation profit of store 2 is given by
piκ2 = (2S + 10t− 2τ + 3τ y¯)
2/588t. Comparing pi∗∗2 = (S + 5t− τ)
2/147t with piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is smaller
than piκ2 , so that store 2 also has no incentives to deviate to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0. Thus, the pair
of y1 = 0 and y2 = 0 does not appear in equilibrium.
Finally, consider the complete regulation of business hours. For the pattern (i) y1 = y¯ and
y2 = 0, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0 given y1 = y¯. The deviation
profit of store 2 is given by piκ2 = (2 + y¯)(2S + 10t − 2τ − (2S + t − 2τ)y¯)
2/6t(5y¯ − 14)2.
Comparing pi∗∗2 = ((2 + y¯)(−2S − 10t + (2S + t)y¯) + τ(4 − (5y¯ − 4)y¯))
2/6t(2 + y¯)(5y¯ − 14)2
with piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is smaller than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2 has incentives to deviate to y2 = y¯ from
y2 = 0. Thus, the pair of y1 = y¯ and y2 = 0 does not appear in equilibrium. For the pattern
(ii) y1 = y¯ and y2 = y¯, suppose that store 1 deviates to y1 = 0 from y1 = y¯ given y2 =
y¯. The deviation profit of store 1 is given by piκ1 = (4S + 6t − τ(4 + y¯))
2/294t. Comparing
pi∗∗1 = (4 − y¯)(4S + 6t − 4τ − (4S − 3t − 4τ)y¯)
2/6t(5y¯ − 14)2 with piκ1 , pi
∗∗
1 is greater than pi
κ
1 .
Thus, store 1 has no incentives to deviate to y1 = 0 from y1 = y¯. Then, suppose that store
2 deviates to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯ given y1 = y¯. The deviation profit of store 2 is given by
piκ2 = ((2 + y¯)(−2S − 10t + (2S + t)y¯) + τ(4 − (5y¯ − 4)y¯))
2/6t(2 + y¯)(5y¯ − 14)2. Comparing
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pi∗∗2 = (2 + y¯)(2S + 10t − 2τ − (2S + t − 2τ)y¯)
2/6t(5y¯ − 14)2 with piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is greater than pi
κ
2 ,
so that store 2 also has no incentives to deviate to y2 = 0 from y2 = y¯. Thus, the pair of
y1 = y¯ and y2 = y¯ appears in equilibrium. For the pattern (iii) y1 = 0 and y2 = 0, suppose that
store 1 deviates to y1 = y¯ from y1 = 0 given y2 = 0. The deviation profit of store 1 is given by
piκ1 = (4− y¯)(4S+6t−4τ−(4S−3t−5τ)y¯)
2/6t(5y¯−14)2. Comparing pi∗∗1 = 2(2S+3t−2τ)
2/147t
with piκ1 , pi
∗∗
1 is smaller than pi
κ
1 . Thus, store 1 has incentives to deviate to y1 = y¯ from y1 = 0.
Then, suppose that store 2 deviates to y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0 given y1 = 0. The deviation profit of
store 2 is given by piκ2 = (2S +10t− 2τ +3τ y¯)
2/588t. Comparing pi∗∗2 = (S +5t− τ)
2/147t with
piκ2 , pi
∗∗
2 is smaller than pi
κ
2 , so that store 2 also has no incentives to deviate y2 = y¯ from y2 = 0.
Thus, the pair of y1 = 0 and y2 = 0 does not appear in equilibrium.
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